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O PSO M M IN G
T U S S E N  H E R V O R M IN G  EN T R A N S F O R M A S  IE: SH A LO M  V IR  S U ID -A F R IK A ?
In hierd ie  artikel word uitgegaan van die standpunt dat daar in S u id -A fr ik a  
feitelik k on sen su s bestaan oor die noodsaak v ir  ing rype nde  sosio-politieke 
ve rande rin g , maar dat m enings oor hoe en in watter r ig t in g  sodanige 
v e ra n d e n n g  moet p laasv ind , wyd uiteenloop.
Daar word twee basiese benade rings ten opsigte  van ve rande rin g  onderske i, 
naamlik 'n  reform istiese en 'n  transfo rm istie se  benade ring. B inne die 
reform istiese kategorie word weer 'n  reaksionêre en 'n  pragm atiese groepe ring  
onderske i en b inne  die transfo rm istie se  kategorie 'n  pragm atiese en 
revo lusionêre  g roepe ring .
V e rand e ring stra teg ieë  wat tot die bogemelde groepe se b e sk ik k in g  is, word 
ondersoek. Klem word veral op d rie  moontlike strategieë gelé: politieke 
m ob ilisering, geweld en isolasie. Ten slotte word oorweeg of C h ristene  in 
S u id -A fr ik a  'n  byd rae  tot politieke ve rande rin g  kan lewer. Daar word tot die 
g e vo lg tre k k in g  gekom dat dit wel moontlik is, maar dat skou spe lagtige  resultate 
nie verw ag moet word nie.
Paper p resented at the C onsu lta tion  on Evange lica ls and Am erican Public 
Life (T o  Se rve  the Present A ge ) held May 4-6, 1989 in Philadelphia, 
Pennsy lvan ia .
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Aangesien  die artikel reeds in Mei 1989 as 'n  referaat b y  ’n konferensie 
aangebied is, is sekere van die heel jongste politieke ontw ikke linge in 
S u id -A fr ik a  nog nie daarin ve rd iskonteer nie. Die basiese analise-model word 
egter as steeds ge ld ig  aangebied.
1. A G R E E D  - ON C H A N G E
"We accept the ve rd ic t of the past until the need fo r change cries out 
loudly enough to force upon us a choice between the comforts of fu rthe r 
inertia and the irksom eness of action ." (Learned H a n d .)1
The  va st  majority of South  A fr ican s, from the radical left to the fa r right, are 
agreed on one issue: change, fa r-reach in g  change. T h is  proposition should, 
however, be qualified. Agreement is restricted to the fact of - perhaps even 
the necessity  for - change. It does not include the nature, the direction, the 
final object o r  the most desirab le end re su lts of change.
Change  is always unpredictable, and it can be unexpectedly rapid:
• In Feb ruary  1917 Lenin spoke of the s tru gg le  in R u ssia  which he then 
thought would still last "fo r  a ve ry  long time". In  October 1917 the
Bo lshev ist ic  Revolution was a fait accompli.
• Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in the lifetime of its form er prime m inister, Ian 
Sm ith, who - with reference to the possib ility  of majority governm ent - once 
exclaimed: "N eve r in a thousand  y e a rs ! "
• In South A frica  any suggestion  of peace in Angola  and independence for 
Namibia would have been sh ru gge d  off less than two yea rs ago.
People 's perceptions of the future  as s ign ified  b y  the ir reactions to the 
inevitab ility  of change, can gu ide  an ana lysis  of the p resent situation in South
2 All quotations, un less otherw ise indicated, are from T r ip p  RT  1985 The 
International T h e sau ru s  of Quotations Penguin Books: 73-75.
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A frica , and stimulate reflection on a possib le  future  - without getting trapped 
in the impasse known as the pa ra ly s is  of ana lysis. My analytical model h inges 
on the aforementioned perceptions and reactions of people, and it obviates the 
need for inadequate categories such as le ft-r igh t, libe ra l-conservative  (or 
v e r l ig -v e rk ra m p ), rad ica l-reactionary and especially b lack-white. T h is  model 
is premised on two basic attitudes towards change in South A frica: a reform ist 
and a tran sfo rm ist att itude .3
Reform ers see change - or reform, as some of them call it - as essentia lly a 
p rocess of socio-political adjustment and accommodation. T h is  d istinctly  
evo lu tionary process is designed to leave - in p rincip le  at least - ex isting  
stru c tu re s  of society and the cu rrent ru les of the political game intact. 
T ran sfo rm ers, on the other hand, work for transform ation that is root-directed 
or radical socio-political change. To them the basic stru c tu re s  of society cannot 
remain, and therefore a fundam entally new style  of politics is called for.
These  d ive rgent attitudes do not inevitab ly coincide with the varie ty  of party  
political affiliations in - and outside - South A frica, although basic trends of 
thought within most of the g ro u p in g s  on the political scene are either 
predom inantly reform ist or transform ist. The  re form ist-transform ist dichotomy 
is most v isib le  in South A fr ic a n s ' basic attitude to race as a political factor. 
Reform ers are bent on maintaining the racial basis of the present system  - albeit
3 The basic re form ist-transform ist categories were f irs t  explored by C h risto  
Nel, co -ord inator of the f irs t  w orkshop  of the Consu ltative  Bu sin e ss  
Movement. More can be read about it in the publication which resulted from 
th is w orkshop: Du Preez, Max, Evan s, Gavin and Grealy, Rosemary 
(e d s. ),  1988. The Broederstroom  Encounter. Johannesbu rg  : Consu ltative  
B u sin e ss  Movement. (Availab le  from: The Consu ltative  Bu sin e ss 
Movement, P.O . Box 2352, Johann esbu rg , 2000.) I m yself have extended 
and refined th is model by add ing  the reactionary and revo lutionary  
dim ensions; see below and also see Du P le ssis, L.M . 1988. "D ie  R S A  in 
die jaar 2000: ’n Politieke Toekom sb lik". Woord en Daad/Word and 
Action, 28(315): 11-15.
532
in an overhauled form. T ransform ers on the other hand are committed to its 
replacement with at the ve ry  least a non-racial dem ocracy.1
2. T H E  R E F O R M E R S
"T h e  more th in g s  change, the more they remain the sam e." (A lphonse  
K a r r . )
The  two most powerful white political parties in South A frica, the ru ling  
National Party (N P ) and the official opposition , the C onse rva tive  Party (C P ), 
are the home bases fo r reform ist politics. However, many of the b lacks, 
so-called coloureds and A sia n s  operating w ithin the present political system  and 
partic ipating in its in stitu tions, are probab ly  more reform ist than transform ist. 
Reform ers are also not totally absent among suppo rte rs  of the Democratic Party 
(D P ),  a white political pa rty  to the left of the NP and the C P . S
The movements I have labelled with a reform ist tag are in many respects, to 
say  the least, not exactly b ird s  of a feather. An  additional d istinction must 
therefore be drawn between reactionary and pragmatic reform ers.
1 I use the qualification "at the ve ry  least" because there are also 
transform ers who would want to substitu te  a more tho rough ly  black o r 
"A f r ic a n " political system  for the p resent white o r  "E u rop e an " dominated 
one.
* T h is  p a rty  was formed th rough  amalgamation of the P ro g re ss ive  Federal 
Party  (P F P ), the Independent Party  ( IP )  and the National Democratic 
Movement (N D M ), i.e. the form er parliam entary opposition to the "le ft " of 
the governm ent. The  new pa rty  still experiences d ifficu lty  to develop a 
new identity, since it has to p rov ide  a new home to form er political riva ls. 
It is for instance still led by  a trium virate.
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2.1 Reactionary reformers
The reactionary reform ers are mostly neo-Verw oerd ians who su b sc r ib e  to the 
traditional model of apartheid: a South A frica  d iv ided  among its va rio u s ethnic 
(in  effect: racial) g rou p s  in recognition of what is called the r ig h t  to political 
self-determ ination of peoples.
The re  are two main varia tions on th is theme. The C P  perceives separate 
development as a g rand io se  model of social eng ineering, designed  to help 
d istr ib u te  the coun try  geograph ica lly  among its peoples in such a way that white 
p riv ile ge  remains essentia lly  intact. With certain reactionary g ro u p in g s  - to 
wit the A fr ik a n e r  W eerstandsbew eging (A W B ), the A fr ika ne r Vo lksw ag  (AVW ) 
and the H erstig te  Nasionale Party  (H N P ) - the partition idea has taken on 
separatist dim ensions. These  people, mainly A fr ika n e rs , are prepared to 
re stric t the ir demands for a peop le 's state to a smaller portion of the country, 
on condition that they must then be left free to determine the ir own affa irs in 
the ir geograph ica lly  (more) modest Boerestaat. What they actually env isage  is 
a form of secession, recogn iz ing that the greate r part of South A frica  (outside 
their homeland) will be racially m ixed o r  desegregated.
With all reactionary reform ers the bottom line is, however, the same: political 
s tru c tu re s  in a new South A frica  must guarantee white self-determ ination, while 
racial segregation must remain and must come to full fru ition  in an utopia of 
optimal territoria l separation.
2.2 Pragm atic reform ers
The pragm atic reform ers are prepared to go a long way in m aking concessions 
to other g ro u p s  in o rde r to get rid  of ug ly  apartheid. D u r in g  the last few 
years they have been co in ing a number of o sten sib ly  new political ph rase s such 
as accommodation fo r all in a society of m inorities, the abolition of un ne ce ssa ry  
and o ffensive  d iscrim ination, political partic ipation to the h ighe st  level - all of 
these w ithin the framework of racially defined own and general a ffa irs. T h is  
last qualification evidences the bottom line of these neo -seg regation ists: the 
final effective say  in political matters has to remain with the p riv ileged  m inority. 
T h is  is w hy race has to be upheld  as a dec isive  constituent of any  new 
ju rid ico-politica l d ispensation .
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The pragmatic reformers are in power. T h e ir policies have not won - and will 
p robab ly  not win - legitimacy with the voteless majority in South A frica. NP 
reform ers have raised expectations which, in tu rn , have unleashed renewed 
(and unprecedented) opposition to the regime. The response of the powers 
that be has been the conversion of civil governm ent into secu ritoc racy . The 
lack of legitimacy of the regime is compounded by the lack of planned and 
systematic reform. Reform is often equated with mere ad hoc reaction to 
political p re ssu re . In the long run the legitimacy c r is is  makes for an increased 
dose of s trong  arm tactics fo r the regime to retain power.
In all fa irne ss, however, let me add a footnote to what I have just said. The 
NP initiated political reform against considerable odds. It has also gone some 
distance in a llay ing certain deep-seated prejudices and fears of many of its 
traditional supporte rs. I am re fe rring  in particu la r to the success it had in 
canva ss in g  support fo r the idea of p ow e r-shar ing  relative to the 1983 
referendum. The majority of A fr ika n e rs  trad itionally believed that 
p ow e r-shar ing  would be the death-knell for the su rv iv a l of whites in South 
A frica. It is therefore in this sense a p ity  that reform has stalled d u r in g  the 
last three yea rs or so of P.W. Botha 's  leadership.
3. T H E  T R A N S F O R M E R S
"N o th ing  is permanent but change ." (H e rac litu s.)
The  transfo rm ist approach also covers a wide spectrum  of political affiliations: 
the Pan A fr ica n ist  C on g re ss  (P A C ),  the Azanian People 's O rganization 
(A Z A P O ),  the South A frican  Communist Party (S A C P ) ,  the A frican  National 
C o n g re ss  (A N C ),  the United Democratic Front ( U D F ) , ‘ Inkatha, certain 
so-called coloured and A sian political parties partic ipating in the tri-cameral 
system  (fo r example A lan H end rick se 's  Labour Party  (L P ) )  and the white 
parliam entary opposition to the left of the NP (the D P ). The  transfo rm ers 
con sist of a revo lu tionary  and a pragm atic group.
* Which actually is an umbrella organization with a number of more localized 
a ffilia te s.
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3.1 Revolutionary transformers
The aim of the revo lutionary  tran sfo rm ers is to substitute  a people 's democracy 
fo r the present stru c tu re s  of opp ression  th ro ugh  a stru gg le  of the people. 
V iolence or armed s tru gg le  is an important dimension of this strategy  but it is 
neither the on ly  nor necessarily  its p rincipa l dimension. What is of prime 
importance though  is that democracy m ust ultimately be an achievement of the 
people. The  phy sica l and sp iritua l mobilization of the oppressed  masses is 
therefore of paramount strateg ic  sign ificance. South A fr ican s  are to be 
educated politica lly fo r a fundam entally new fu ture  much of which must, a lready 
in the present, come to righ t  in alternative peop le 's structu re s: people 's 
movements, peop le 's  education, peop le 's cou rts etc. Infection b y  the struc tu re s 
of the status quo  takes the edge off revo lu tionary  action. A ll possib le  forms 
of co-operation with and co-option into the present system  is therefore 
v ig o ro u s ly  opposed.
There  are two main streams among the revolutionaries. The f irs t  is (b lack) 
Pan-A frican ism  a sp ir in g  to restore A frica  to her natural ch ild ren who are 
predom inantly - though not nece ssarily  - black. N on -b lacks can be 
P an -A frican ist  as well if they identify with and allow themselves to be absorbed 
by the black cause which is, in a word, the cause of the oppressed . The PAC  
and A ZA PO  are the chief proponents of th is black con sc iousness stream.
The non-rac ial o r  c h a r te r is t 7 stream as espoused b y  the SA C P , the A N C  and
7 So to s ig n ify  adherence to the Freedom C ha rte r, a d istin ctly  non-racial 
statement of liberation dating from 1955 and the preamble of which contains 
inter alia the follow ing statements:
" . . . ( S ) o u t h  A frica  belongs to all who live in it, b lack and 
white ...
" . . .  (O )n ly  a democratic state, based on the will of the people can 
secure  to all the ir b irth r ig h t  w ithout d istinction of colour, race, sex 
or belief . . . "  (my em phases).
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the U D F with its affiliates, is more consc iously  inc lu sive  of all races in South 
A frica. It is furtherm ore less p re sc rip tive  as rega rd s identification with a 
racia lly defined cause: oppression  is to a la rger extent defined in 
socio-economic rather than black-w hite terms.
3 .2  Pragm atic transform ers
The pragm atic transform ers by  and large champion non-racialism  in a 
m u lti-party  democracy. In a sense they understand  non-racialism  and 
dem ocracy d ifferent from the revolutionaries, but they do share the latters' 
conviction that doing away with the racial basis of the system  will require much 
more than mere adjustment and accommodation. The  pragm atists are also at 
odds with the revolutionaries as to strategy. They  are less in favou r of using  
b rute  force and are mostly repelled by the idea of re so rting  to violence. The ir 
approach is m any-sided, their strategies experimental in nature. A s multiple 
stra teg ists  they also have less qualms about w orking - to a certain extent at 
least - from w ithin the system. They will therefore also t ry  to use the system 
in o rde r to transform  the system  itself.
Th is  g ro u p in g  is in real political terms the least powerful. Most of the 
non-w hite pragmatic transfo rm ers do have political power bases. So-called 
coloured and Indian political parties partic ipating in the tri-cameral system  have 
it r ig h t  in parliament, while some black political movements, like Inkatha of 
Gatsha Buthelezi, have it in se lf-g o ve rn in g  (non-independent) hom elands.’ 
These  g ro u p in g s  are, however, rejected in no uncertain terms by the 
suppo rte rs  of mass democratic movements such as UDF, A Z A P O  etc. T h e ir most 
serious political concern seems to be their deficient legitimacy at a national level
- as evidenced, for instance, by rid icu lou sly  low percentage polls in elections 
for the bodies and institutions th rough  which they seek to operate.
These  homelands refuse to accept independence because they regard  
them selves part of the la rge r South A frica, but they do co-operate within 
a system  of legislative and govermental autonomy p rovided  for in a 
pre -independence phase.
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While pragm atic transfo rm ers have not been ve ry  successfu l in m ustering 
popu lar (white) support - due pa rtly  to a lack of political experience and partly  
to the fact that they are ind iv idua lists who have not really defined themselves 
as a d istinct political g roup in g . Furtherm ore the ir message is not ve ry  popular 
with the p riv ileged  m inority whom they have to convince that fo rgo ing  some of 
their p riv ile ge s today, will be in the long term interest of South Africa.
Th is  category of transfo rm ers neverthe less remains a political force which is 
not to be neglected, with a total percentage support more or less equalling that 
of the far righ test CP, p re sently  the official opposition in the white House of 
Assem bly. Furtherm ore some of the most creative political th inke rs in South 
A frica  are th r iv in g  in the trial and e rro r  atmosphere of pragmatic 
transform ation. Th e ir multiple stra tegy  approach enhances the ir political 
mobility and they are well equipped to keep abreast of change. Th is  could 
win a future  DP considerable (white) support in a situation of change and 
transition  - if on ly  it could pull its act together and consolidate its membership 
and, most importantly, its leadership.
4. S T R A T E G IE S
"T h e  interval between the decay of the old and the formation and the 
establishm ent of the new, consitutes a period of transition , which must 
always necessarily  be one of uncerta in ty, con fusion, e rro r, and wild and 
fierce fan tic ism ." (John C. C a lhoun .)
Three mutually supportive  strateg ic  options face both reformers and 
t ran sfo rm e rs:
political mobilization,
the isolation of opponents and
violence.
4.1 Political mobilization
Political mobilization in essence con sists  of canva ss in g  and conso lidating popular 
support fo r a political cause in competition with riva ls. In a sense mobilization 
is what political activ ity  is all about.
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The reform ers' success with th is strategy is limited in princip le since their 
political efforts are targeted mainly at the white electorate. Competition has 
remained intra-paradigm atic, between reactionary and pragmatic reformers. 
D u r in g  the last few years the reactionaries have made noticeable inroads into 
the white electoral support enjoyed by the pragm atists.
Reform ers eagerly claim that the ir particu la r political programme - be it 
pragmatic o r reactionary - enjoys black support or, at least, approval. But 
it has been rather difficult for the ir whites on ly  political endeavours to win 
legitimacy with b lacks. The pragmatic reformers - who control the system  - 
have had limited success in w inning over black support. W inning over has 
mostly meant co-opting people into the system. T h is  in tu rn  has had certain 
unforeseen re su lts. B lacks (and so-called coloureds and A s ia n s ) thus involved 
have generally  speaking not been ve ry  reliable partners. Some of them have 
been seek ing  the kingdom  of own interest f irs t  w ithout any real concern as to 
whether, in the long run, they will be se rv in g  public interest as well. O thers 
have been thw arting the intentions of those who co-opted them, by exploiting 
the ir involvem ent in the system  to promote transfo rm ist politics.
The  benefits which stand to accrue to b lack transfo rm ers from political 
mobilization, are restricted in princip le  too - not because their support base 
is undu ly  narrow, but because they them selves are excluded from normal 
political processes. What is an advantage from an overall transfo rm ist point 
of view though, is that white (pragm atic) tran sfo rm ists do have natural access 
to parliam entary politics, the resu lt being that tran sfo rm ists do have immediate 
links with both parliam entary politics and the extra-parliam entary movement 
which ex ists  on account of the vote lessness of the majority.
Extra -parliam entary  movements have furtherm ore had considerable success in 
m obilizing the m asses for non-parliam entary political action: passive  resistance, 
c iv il disobedience, dem onstrations, boycott actions inside the country, 
mobilizing and o rgan iz in g  w orke rs ' power etc. T h is  movement has in fact been 
so successfu l and so powerful that the reform ist governm ent has found it 
necessary  to clamp down on it with force. More about th is in 4.3 below.
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4.2  Isolation
Since  politics b y  nature invo lves mobilization, one way of ob stru c tin g  political 
p ro g re ss  is to isolate the agents of mobilization from the masses they are to 
mobilize. T h is  has been one of the principa l strateg ie s of the reform ist NP: 
to outlaw tran sfo rm ist activ ists by  (in te r alia) detain ing them without trial, 
bann ing  them, bann ing  the ir organ izations, re stric t in g  the ir activities etc.
T ran sfo rm ist  activ ists  have responded to this with an isolation stra tegy  of a 
d ifferent k ind, namely to isolate the regime and its suppo rte rs  internationally. 
T h is  has been happen ing with respect to inter alia diplomatic, economic, cultural 
and spo rt in g  relations. Some black transfo rm ers claim that com prehensive 
economic sanctions against South A frica  remains the on ly  non-vio lent method 
that can help b r in g  about changes of a transform ist nature.
4.3  Violence
The inc reasing  lack of legitimacy of the reform ist regime has made fo r the ever 
inc reasing  use of s trong  arm tactics in an attempt to avert resistance and 
maintain power. A  governm ent is sometimes entitled to use  coercion to maintain 
law and o rd e r. T h is  is to be done in pub lic  interest and not sim ply to promote 
a p a rticu la r p a rty  political cause. In  South A frica  public interest, from a 
governm ent perspective, is defined rather narrow ly, re fe rr in g  prim arily  to the 
interests of the p riv ile ged  m inority which are to be protected again st claims 
of the majority.
The reform ist regim e 's fa ilure  to fu rth e r pub lic  interest in a com prehensive 
sense, is the root of its lack of legitimacy. It no longer st ic k s  to the basic 
ru le s of the game, and normal legal sa fegua rd s are b y -p a sse d  o r sim ply ignored 
to an eve r in c re asing  extent. More and more unfettered control is exercised 
ove r the live s of those who do not suppo rt  the system . A  securocratic  system  
of governm ent has emerged next to the already battered c iv il system  with the 
form er stead ily  ga in in g  the uppe r hand.
A governm ent which exerc ise s d rastic  executive powers and which is not 
p repared to have its judgem ents and its conduct scru tin ized  on the basis of 
legal norms, is vio lent in p rincip le  - s tru c tu ra lly  violent. In South A frica  this
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violence has manifested itself in practice as well. Aparthe id  as social 
eng ineering  has been forced th rough  at a considerable  price: in su lts  by 
officia ls, the b reak ing  up of families, forced removals, shootings, police 
b ru ta lity  unde r a system  of detention w ithout trial - all these have been 
symptomatic of the ch ron ic subve rs ion  of human r ig h ts, the perve rsion  of 
c iv ilised  princ ip le s of law and, eventually, the g row ing  delegitimatization and 
dehumanization of c iv il governm ent in my country. The  continuation of the 
state of em ergency is evidence of the fact that state violence is still considered 
nece ssary  b y  a regime which apparently  remains committed not to dismantle the 
s tru c tu re s  of m inority priv ilege.
It is one of the miracles of South A frica  that transfo rm ist re sponse  to state 
violence has not itself been inevitab ly and totally violent. Even the A N C , the 
chief proponent of the armed stru gg le  stra tegy, remained essentia lly non-vio lent 
until the early sixties when it was banned.
A N C  violence, which by now appears to have become part and parcel of 
e ve ryd ay  life in South A frica, must be seen in perspective. F ir st ly , though 
the A N C  has been responsib le  for severa l rather atrocious inc idents of violence, 
the ir s trong  arm strength  in no way matches that of the regime. It is most 
un like ly  that the A N C  would succeed in overth row ing the governm ent th rough  
armed stru gg le . Second ly  it is un fa ir to blame all form s of mob violence d u r in g  
riots on the A N C . M any of these incidents are pure  th u g ge ry  for which 
ind iv idua ls  must accept full re sponsib ility . Finally a perspective  of a h isto ry  
of conscious and overt oppression  in South  A frica  helps explain w hy the A N C  
has been re so rtin g  to vio lence as part of its strategy. It does not, however, 
nece ssarily  p rovide  a ba sis  fo r ju s t ify in g  the use of violence.
5. T H E  F U T U R E ?  A S S E S S IN G  A L T E R N A T IV E  S T R A T E G IE S
"C h an ge  is the law of life. A nd  those who look on ly  to the past o r the
present are certain to m iss the fu tu re . "  (John F. K enn edy .)
I am a transform ist, more pragm atic than revo lutionary, and my assessm ent of 
strateg ie s will therefore be coloured b y  my own strateg ic  preferences. 
Furtherm ore, as a C h r ist ian , I find  certain strateg ie s in certain situations 
unacceptable if not reprehensib le. With th is in mind, what then is an
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appropriate  stra tegy  - o r strategies - to help b r in g  to reality a non-rac ial and 
democratic South A frica  with equal opportun ities fo r all her ch ild ren ? A nd  how 
can one as ou ts id e rs  best become involved  in this p ro ce ss?
The  obv iou s answ er appears to be: support the transfo rm ers while, at the same 
time, conv in c in g  the reform ers, if possib le, and o b stru c tin g  them, if necessary. 
To  this end, political mobilization is the most basic of the three strategie s I 
have mentioned, and it will in my assessm ent also be the most successfu l in the 
long run. Isolation and violence can, at most, be suppo rtive  strategies which 
shou ld  be employed with circum spection, lest they su b ve rt  the p ro g re ss  that 
can be made th ro ugh  mobilization.
Political mobilization shou ld  be aimed at m aking the m asses politically conscious 
and at educating them fo r liberation. They shou ld  also be organ ized  politically
- som ething which, at p resent, has to be done aga in st considerable odds 
because of governm ent re stric tion s on many of the principa l actors in the mass 
democratic movement. However, to reap optimal benefits from mobilization it 
shou ld  not be directed at the opp ressed  masses on ly. It is of vital importance 
that transfo rm ist forces in white politics be consolidated too. The new DP, for 
instance, will have to act w ithin the b roader framework of transform ist political 
m obilization.
It will also be in the interest of transform ation politics if non-white transform ist 
revolutionarie s and pragm atists can stop their reciprocal throat cu tting. I 
know that, g iven  certain deep-seated sen sit iv it ie s, co-operation between these 
two g rou p s  do not seem ve ry  likely at the present moment. Nevertheless it 
seems rid icu lous to me that people who sub sc r ibe  to the same basic p rincip le s 
and who in essence cherish  the same ideals, must be separated by  style  and 
stra tegy  to the extent that they become fierce riva ls.
A parthe id  has not on ly  resu lted in but has also th rived  on isolating people from 
one another on a racial basis. Political mobilization as a panacea to apartheid 
shou ld  therefore also actively concentrate on the de-isolation or, more 
positive ly, the integration of b lacks and whites in South A frica. Of great 
sign ificance  in th is respect are, to my mind, in itiatives to involve whites from 
inside South A frica , and in particu la r A fr ik a n e rs , in exp lorative  d iscu ss io n s  
with o rgan iza tions such as the A N C . Not on ly  have these d iscu ss ion s  enhanced
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factual knowledge of views and perceptions on both sides, but it has also had 
sign ificant sym bolic impact. The possib ility  that mass democratic organ izations 
such as the A N C  on the one hand and the regime itself on the other can become 
involved in negotiations on the future  of South A frica, is no longer completely 
beyond contemplation.
International isolation of the regime and the supporte rs of apartheid has been 
ve ry  successfu l in many respects in sp ite of the pred ictions of p rophets of doom 
that boycott will on ly resu lt in a harden ing  of racist attitudes. A  negative side 
effect of a stra tegy  of isolation is that it also str ike s  at people who do not really 
deserve  punishm ent. In the case of com prehensive economic sanctions 
undeserved  punishm ent can devastate the livelihood of many of the v e ry  people 
to whose liberation the said sanctions are supposed  to contribute.
Nevertheless I th ink that it is necessary that people and countrie s outside South 
A frica  adhere - in p rincip le  - to a stra tegy  of iso lating the regime and its 
suppo rte rs  internationally as long as apartheid appears like ly to remain. 
Reform ist South A fricans shou ld  be constantly  reminded that a system  of 
governm ent based on racial d istinctions does not conform to either specifically 
C h r ist ian  o r generally  civ ilized  standa rd s of c iv il governm ent.
Isolation shou ld, however, be care fu lly  targeted. It shou ld  cause optimal 
inconvenience to the regime itself and those of its beneficiaries who can exert 
political p re ssu re  from inside. Boycotts and sanctions shou ld  therefore be 
directed prim arily  at the lu xu rie s  on which members of the p riv ileged  m inority 
u sua lly  th rive . They  should also, if possib le, be aimed at those particu lar 
ind iv idua ls  who and institutions which in some o r other way still indicate 
support fo r the racially biased socio-economic and -political system  in South 
Africa. With an isolation strategy  it is impossible to avoid that innocent people 
also su ffe r. T h is, I gu e ss, is one of the unfortunate p rices that will have to 
be paid for transform ation in South A frica. Innocent su ffe rin g  can neverthe less 
be restricted if sanctions are well targeted.
In any event, international isolation as a stra tegy  is preferable to violence 
which has been and will remain predom inantly counterproductive. Violence as 
a means of ach ieving political goals is problematic in princip le, but it is at best
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also a h ig h ly  insu ffic ient stra tegy  - even in a sup po rtive  capacity. Let me 
explain  why.
A s  fa r as the reform ist regime is concerned, structu ra l violence cannot b uy  it 
the legitimacy it lacks. A t best it can help re inforce stru c tu re s  which, in the 
long run , are  bound to collapse because they lack political m orality. A  few 
battles may be won while, in the long run , the war is lost.
V io lent tran sfo rm ist reaction to the vio lent system , however, g ive s  the 
s tru c tu ra l vio lence of the regime a moral face-lift. It p rov ides the bad ly  needed 
excuses for se cu rito c ra cy . It s tu ffs  governm ent media with usefu l propaganda 
material to demonize or, at least, cast su sp ic ion  on all transfo rm ist endeavours. 
It sw ays people who could have been active tran sfo rm ers ra ther to close ranks 
with the threatened m inority. Viewed from a transfo rm ist perspective  I cannot 
but conclude that all th is is too h igh  a price  to pay for a morally suspect 
stra tegy  which has b y  and large left - and will p robab ly  continue to leave - 
the governm ent unshaken.
I realize that neither the governm ent no r the liberation movements engaged in 
the armed s tru gg le  will simply fo rgo  vio lence as a stra tegy. On the con trary, 
if one is to believe political rhetoric, both sides are prepared  to fight to the 
b itter end. T h is  reminds one of the defin ition of a politician as someone who 
is p repared to sacrifice you r life for his country ! Fortunate ly, however, 
h is to ry  has p roved  that political rhetoric ought to be taken with a p inch of salt!
I th ink  that th is is an area in which there shou ld  be considerab le  involvem ent 
from outside. T h ird  parties coming from the international community are in a 
favourab le  position to exert p re ssu re  on both sides to talk to rather than to 
kill each other.
6. W H AT A B O U T  C H R IS T IA N S ?
" . . .  that all of them may be one, Father, just as you are in me an I and 
in y o u " (John 17:21).
I w ish I could have told you that there is a th ird  force in South A frica, 
com prising the 70°o of its population who are (nom inally af least) C h r ist ia n s,
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ready and able actively to fulfil a mediating function, prepared to voice strong 
opposition to racial oppression  while, at the same time, ho lding a t ight rein over 
the excesses of liberation. Sad ly  enough this is not the case.
C h rist ia n s  are divided along ve ry  much the same lines as the population as a 
whole. White sold iers, figh ting , fo r C h r ist ,  kill te rro rists  ca rry in g  B ib les in 
the ir pockets. Policemen p ro fe ss ing  to be C h r ist ian s  d isrup t the funera ls of 
fellow C h r ist ia n s  killed in incidents of unrest. Political loyalties and prejudices 
have by and large been transp lanted onto the churches and onto C h rist ian  life 
in general.
However, th is is no reason why C h rist ian s  should  remain silent. C h r ist ian s  
from outside the country  can do a lot to help C h r ist ian s  from inside to see what 
common g roun d  they actually share. The C h rist ian  faith has indeed transform ed 
the m inds of many white people I know to come to see the injustices that have 
been and are being committed in South A frica  in the name of the idols of 
su rv iv a l and p rogre ss.
People who call themselves C h r ist ian s  remain answerable to the Gospel - and 
must be confronted with it. They  must also be b rough t into close contact with 
fellow C h r ist ian s  who, especially in South A frica, have been separated from 
them as a resu lt of the artificial d iv is ion s of apartheid.
The re su lts that can be achieved th rough  w ork ing  with C h r ist ia n s  are un like ly 
to be spectacular - especially in the short term. In the long run, however, 
the ir effect can be much more than can be determined b y  human calculation 
only.
Let me conclude on a cautiously  optim istic note with reference to three examples 
of encou rag ing  incidents and changing  scenarios which date from the recent 
past, and which (d irectly  o r ind irectly) invo lve C h rist ian s.
The f irs t  goes back to late 1986 early 1987. I was involved with three other 
colleagues, all of them theologians, in a project which tested in practice the 
va lid ity  of a find in g  which emerged from a report of the Investigation into
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In te rg ro up  Relations of the Human Sciences Research Council ( H S R C ) . ’ It was 
in ter alia concluded that, in princip le, C h r ist ian s  in South A frica  share values 
which can and will most p robab ly  be vital to the bu ild ing  of a new nation. 
The  fou r of us initiated the d ra ftin g  of a document in which such con sensu s 
could be spelt out. We sought (and obtained) the co-operation of C h r ist ian s 
rep re senting  a wide range of political loyalties and affiliations.
The  re su lts of o u r project, which have been pub lished, 10 were rather 
encou rag ing . We found that, when it comes to basics, C h r ist ia n s  are to a large 
extent agreed on the kind  of political future  that should be aimed at in South 
A frica. In practice, of course, much will still have to be done to remove 
obstacles which have been keeping people with substantia lly  corre spond ing  
convictions apart. The possib ility  that the minds of C h r ist ian s  can grow  
together at a more practical o r operational level can, however, not be excluded.
Second ly  C h rist ian  leaders were actively involved in the resolution of the c r is is  
caused by  the hunge r str ike  of people detained without trial. P ro gre ss ive ly  
minded political transfo rm ers, such as B ishop  Desmond Tutu, took the lead.
I was astonished by  the great measure of con sensu s reached between these 
leaders and the M in ister of Law and O rde r, Mr. A driaan  V lok, who is perceived 
as perhaps the most v is ib le  incarnation of reform ist se cu rito c ra cy . I was even
’ Main Committee, H SR C  Investigation  into In te rg ro up  Relations. 1985. Die 
Su id -A fr ik a a n se  Samelewing: W erklikhede en Toekomsmoontlikhede. 
Pretoria : H SR C . The find in g  re ferred to in the text was actually based 
on the more specialized report of the W ork Committee: Religion. 1985. 
Re lig ion, In te rg roup  Relations and Social C hange  in South A frica . Pretoria 
: H SR C .
1( See Lategan, Be rna rd , K in gh o rn , Johann and De V illie rs, Ettiene. 1987. 
The  Option for In c lu sive  Dem ocracy: A  Theologica l-eth ica l S tu d y  of 
appropriate  Social Values for South A frica . Stellenbosch : Centre  for 
Herm eneutics. (Availab le  from: The Centre fo r Herm eneutics, Department 
of Biblical Stud ie s, U n ive rs ity  of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, 7600.)
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more im pressed by the sp irit  of re sponsib ility  and mutual concern in which the 
negotiations took place.
Allow me in the final instance to generalize somewl-at. Developments d u r in g  
the past few weeks and months in vo lv in g  C h r ist ian s  in South A frica, have been 
prom ising. It appears as if a determination to settle d isputes of long standing 
among certain C hrist ian  churches is em erging. C hu rch e s  belonging to the 
so-called Dutch-Reform ed family have had prom ising conciliatory talks in recent 
times. All of th is is tak ing place again st the back-d rop  of a political scenario 
which to an increasing  extent seems to favour a negotiated settlement of the 
South A frican  issue. In th is respect the following shou ld  be noted:
• Internationally there has been an adjustment in the approach of some of 
the major powers to the South A frican  issue. Most notable and dramatic 
is the Soviet U n ion 's  cautious involvement in peace initiatives in South and 
Southern  Africa. It is realized to an increasing  extent that armed stru gg le  
is not go in g  to reso lve any of the most p re ss in g  socio-political issues within 
the foreseeable future.
• There  is a g row ing p reparedness amongst major liberation movements in- 
and outside South A frica  - and I am th in k in g  in particu lar of the A N C  and 
its allies - to engage in negotiations about a post-aparthe id  South A frica  
rather than to resort to violence. An  A N C  document, Constitutional 
Guidelines for a Democratic South A f r ic a ,11 has for example been placed 
on the table as a serious contribution to the debate on the political future  
of South Africa.
• Since the election of M r. F.W. de K lerk  as leader of the National Party  it 
appears as if governm ent attitudes m ight mellow, and as if there is a 
g row ing  preparedness to d iscu ss  issues which had p re v iou s ly  been held 
out as non -negotiab le s. Let me, however, immediately add: the proof of
11 1988. Constitutional G uideliness for a Democratic South A frica. Lusaka, 
A N C . (Availab le  from: The  A frican  National C on g re ss, P.O . Box 31791, 
Lusaka , Zambia / P.O . Box 38, 28 Penton Street, London N1 9 P R .)
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the pud d in g  will lie in the eating. Mr. De K lerk  and his suppo rte rs  must 
realize that prom ising s ig n s  alone are not suffic ient to get South A frica  out 
of its p re sent dilemmas.
One event of major sign ificance needs mention. On 11 March 1988 the South 
A frican  Law Commission released a w ork ing  paper on g roup  and human 
r i g h t s . 11 The  Commission is a creature of sta tu te”  which, from time to 
time, advise s the governm ent on law reforms. It con sists of judges, 
m agistrates, law yers, law academics and officials of the Departement of 
Justice. Its advice in the past pertained mainly to matters which were not 
seen as politically contentious. The  report on g roup  and human righ ts  
was requested by the M in ister of Justice, Mr. Kobie Coetzee.
The Commission does no beating about the bush  in p re sc rib in g  a panacea 
to human righ ts  ailments in South A frica . Not on ly  does it p ropose a bill 
of r ig h ts  which, in e ve ry  respect, lives up to international standards, but 
is is also v e ry  frank  about the fact that fa r-reach in g  changes in the South 
A frican  legal and political system  have become com pellingly urgent. The 
document is a w e ll-argued  plea for transform ation in the true sense of the 
word. The  conclusions of the Commission as well as the strategy  it 
recommends for the implementation of its proposed bill of r igh ts, is backed 
by an inc isive  and in s igh tfu l s tu d y  of the sign ificance  of human righ ts, 
nationally as well as internationally. What in effect is recommended, is a 
free, democratic and non-racial South A frica.
Of cou rse  the South A frican  governm ent is not necessarily  bound to accept 
and implement the recommendations of the Commission which are, at any 
rate, still subject to comment until 31 A u g u s t  1989 when w ork ing  on a final 
report will commence. A t the same time, however, the governm ent will have
1J South A frican  Law Commission. 1989. W ork ing  Paper 25, Project 58: 
G roup  and Human R igh ts. Pretoria. (Av ia lab le  from: the Secre ta ry, S .A .  
Law Commission, Private  Bag X668, Pretoria, 0001.)
13 The  South A frican  Law Commission Act 19 of 1973.
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to con sider these find in gs ve ry  se riou sly  and will have to make its position 
known in no ambivalent terms. The Commission has no party  political 
affiliations and is respected as an objective and independent forum of 
experts. What is more: it is seen to be the governm ent’s own Commission 
and, in a sense, it is.
A conclud ing thought: the Christ ian  faith exhorts its adherents never to 
despair; the s ign s  of the times in South A frica  at present lend increasing 
factual suppo rt  to such an attitude of ho pe -th rough -fa ith . Please continue to 
p ray for us!
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